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Abstract: This paper explores the paradox that the EU invests significant effort into
including regulatory issues into Free Trade Agreements with apparently little binding
impact other than in the case of prospective candidate countries who are likely to become
members of the EU. The explanation does not appear to be pressure from the EU for
binding agreements that is resisted by developing country partners. The main non trade
issues in the recent CARIFORUM EPA appear to have been sought by the CARIFORUM
negotiators, perhaps for internal reasons. The EU may also be seeking to establish soft-
law precedents for more binding rules, but there is little evidence as yet of this and the EU
itself is equally unwilling to be bound, eg on competition policy, leaving the mystery still
unresolved
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Key Words: Non trade issues, bilateral trade agreements2
1. Introduction
As a successful customs union the EEC and now the EU (as we will refer to what
has now become the European Union ) has always been ambivalent about the benefits of a
purely multilateral approach to trade policy and has used bilateral agreements as an active
tool of foreign and external economic policy. For a while at the end of the 1990s and the
beginning of the new century the EU explicitly looked to the WTO as both the primary
means of liberalising trade and in a limited way as a means of extending on the global
plane its internal “rules-based” regime and pronounced itself wholly committed to this
system. More recently it has shifted the emphasis back towards bilateralism as multilateral
negotiations faltered and in particular after key elements of regulatory issues (the
Singapore issues) were progressively dropped from the multilateral Doha Roundagenda
As the EU has deepened its own economic integration through the building of the
single market and notably the pursuit of the four freedoms of free movement of goods,
services, labour and capital, through a complex process of regulatory harmonisation and
mutual recognition, the more it has sought to include similar issues in its regional or
bilateral trade agreements with non members. This is what we mean by deep integration.
The term Deep Integration was first coined by Lawrence in 1996. He used it to
refer to a process of removing barriers to trade and investment that are behind the border,
notably regulatory barriers or even mere differences that make it harder to do business
across borders than within jurisdictions. The term deep integration should perhaps be
extended so that the policy dimension referred to here can be called Deep Institutional
Integration (DII) while simultaneously we should be aware of market processes that are
related to this.
2.An Overview of EU BilateralAgreements
Since the 1960s the EU has constructed a complex network of bilateral preferential
trade agreements, mostly with developing countries. As a result the EU conducts trade with
most of its partners on a non-MFN basis. However, the small number of MFN partners
including USA and Japan, with limited preferences for China, account for about 30% of
trade by value.
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Historically the main preferential agreements were with the countries in Africa,
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) and the countries of the Mediterranean region. The early
agreements were non reciprocal and incomplete. The EU opened its markets to ACP
country goods but they did not have to liberalise in the same way. This principle violates
Article XXIV of the GATT but was given a waiver in the GATT – the so-called Lomé
Waiver which was not renewed when its extension to cover the Cotonou Agreement which
renewed the Lomé agreement, was refused by GATT members. In the case of the early
generation of Mediterranean agreements, before the Euromed notion was developed, an
attempt was made to square the circle by declaring that the agreements were full free trade
areas but that the market opening by the southern partner was to be postponed more or less
1 Own calculations from COMTRADE3
indefinitely. The EU eventually under pressure of the loss of the Lomé Waiver had to
propose Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) which were fully reciprocal FTA.
Meanwhile the EU has continued to negotiate and sign FTAs with countries from two
distinct groups. First, it has worked to consolidate its links with countries whose
economies are tightly interlinked with the EU, most obviously with the eastern and
southern European actual and potential candidate countries. Some of these agreements
notably the members of the European Economic Area and Turkey are of long standing and
include significant elements of deep integration. Others such as those with the candidates
and potential candidates in the southern and western Balkans are explicitly aimed at
moving the partners towards full implementation of the single market Acquis
Communautaire. The EU has tried via first its neighbourhood policy (which included the
Euromed countries) but latterly through the more focussed the Eastern partnership
agreements being negotiated with countries such as Ukraine, Moldova and the republics in
the Caucuses that in principle meet the first and necessary condition of EU membership of
being geographically in Europe. These latter all aim to be reciprocal FTAs with elements
of deep integration
At the same time the EU has concluded in the last 10 years a series of FTA that can
hardly be described as “regional” trade agreements, with partners such as Mexico, Chile
and South Africa. In some cases these were motivated by political logic. The launch
process for what became the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations at first
prompted the EU to hold back on launching new FTA negotiations beyond those designed
to facilitate its own enlargement. But since 2006 the EU has embarked on an ambitious
project to launch FTA talks with trading partners to whom it thinks market access is
important for the EU itself, and the EU-India project for example, fits into this pattern,
even though it is reported that the initiative came from New Delhi.
2.1 “Global Europe”
In 2006 Peter Mandelson launched the “Global Europe” initiative. Underlying this
was the proposition that the EU should consider its own offensive interests more clearly,
not least in the face of active US bilateralism notably in Asia, and strive bilaterally for
what it could not get at the WTO. This initiative includes two important elements - the
choice of large growing markets as partners; going beyond tariffs reduction as the way to
get market access. It is not certain how far the new trade strategy of Commissioner de
Gucht will continue on the same lines, but for now we write as if the strategy remains the
same
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The EU’s current strategy in all of its trade agreements places great emphasis on
deep integration in the sense that it recognises that “shallow” integration in the form of the
removal of trade barriers at borders such as tariffs and QRs is inadequate. Not least
because its own tariffs and other border barriers are relatively low (outside the highly
sensitive area of agriculture), which reduces the EU’s attractiveness as a partner in any
form of reciprocal liberalisation process. It sees such deep integration agreements as
important for realising Europe’s “competitiveness”.
The 2006 background paper on “Global Europe”
3 made it clear that the EU would
be seeking to complement the WTO with bilateral trade deals with major partners.
2 See the consultations at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/?consul_id=144
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Strategy {COM(2006) 567 final}4
“The key economic criteria for new FTA partners should be market potential
(economic size and growth) and the level of protection against EU export interests
(tariffs and non tariff barriers).”
The text insists that the new generation of FTAs must address services and
regulatory issues.
“New competitiveness driven FTAs would need to be comprehensive and
ambitious in coverage, aiming at the highest possible degree of trade liberalisation
including far-reaching liberalisation of trade in services covering all modes of
supply.”
It offers sets ambitious targets for the new type of FTA:
“Future FTAs would also need new ways of addressing non tariff barriers. The
effectiveness of competitiveness-driven FTAs will depend in part on their capacity
to tackle non tariff barriers. Our ability to tackle NTBs will differ depending on our
trade partners. Regulatory convergence, for example, is more likely to be achieved
with neighbourhood partners than others. But these issues must be on the agenda
with all our prospective partners. Mutual recognition agreements should be
concluded where necessary and useful.”
The last sentence is remarkable since the EU has had great difficulty implementing
such an agreement with the USA, and this was even the last element of EU’s internal
market to function. The mutual recognition element of the Turkey-EU custom union only
followed 10 years later.
The initial negotiations under this rubric were opened with India and South Korea
both of whom had expressed a desire to have such FTAs with elements of deep integration.
We will look at both of these agreements. As we note, “deep integration” implies major
internal regulatory reform and it has been suggested that this is an aim of the Indian side as
well as the EU and Korea. The EU paper claims:
“Our potential partners such as India, Korea and ASEAN seek a very high level of
ambition as regards investment which goes well beyond the provisions of current
EU FTAs.”
If we are to be realistic about this process, we have to accept that very little
progress has actually been made in deep integration so far, other than with the EEA and
candidate countries. The EU recently commissioned a survey of deep provisions in its own
and other FTAs and found them wanting.
4 Strong agreements have been signed with the
EU’s neighbours and with accession candidates but with hardly any other partner.
“The current geography of EU FTAs mainly covers our neighbourhood and
development objectives well, but our main trade interests less well. The content of
these agreements also remains limited: they may deliver on market access
4 Bourgeois Dawar Evenett (2007)5
commitments but even an advanced agreement like the EU-Chile FTA does not
present major progress in areas such as IPR, subsidies, SPS or TBT.
5”
A recent study by Sapir Horn and Mavroidis (2009)
6 finds that, although EU
FTAs frequently appear to include deeper commitments in GATT/WTO domains and
commitments in areas where there are no multilateral commitments, these are generally
little more than declaratory except for actual and potential EU candidate countries. The
EU is still negotiating under this mandate but it is not clear that with arrival of the new
Commissioner de Gucht this policy will continue in the same way.
2.2 Deep integration provisions in EU agreements
The most comprehensive significant trade agreements the EU has signed with non-
members was the European Economic Area Switzerland (which include the 4 Freedoms
except for agriculture and fisheries). The EEA agreement is a deep Free Trade Area, but
not a Customs Union. It requires partners to sign up to all the EU acquis except for
fisheries and agriculture, and external tariffs; where the acquis were in place the EU
renounced the use of contingent protection. The EEA partners had to commit to amending
all their relevant domestic legislation and subject themselves to a supranational tribunal the
ESA (EFTA Surveillance Authority) which would enforce EU law in their territory. It
involved a major loss of sovereignty, rendered acceptable probably because most of the
governments who signed it expected to join the EU. Once a state has joined the EEA,
membership of the EU becomes attractive because in order to get some say in the rules.
For countries whose overwhelmingly important main market is the EU, conformity to EU
norms is a market necessity.
7 The EEA model is unlikely to be attractive to many other
partners. The loss of sovereignty is extreme, however, the EU will only give unconditional
free access where it gets a total guarantee of conformity.
The next deepest agreements have been the Europe Agreements signed since the
early 1990s with Central European candidates for EU membership. It is actually surprising
when one reads them how weak the requirements for deep integration via approximation of
laws actually was in the Europe Agreements as such. The Poland agreement which was
something of a template stated:
“The Contracting Parties recognize that the major precondition for Poland's
economic integration into the Community is the approximation of that country's
existing and future legislation to that of the Community. Poland shall use its best
endeavours to ensure that future legislation is compatible with Community
legislation.”
“The approximation of laws shall extend to the following areas in particular:
customs law, company law, banking law, company accounts and taxes, intellectual
property, protection of workers at the workplace, financial services, rules on
competition, protection of health and life of humans, animals and plants, consumer
5 GLOBAL EUROPE: COMPETING IN THE WORLD
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/october/tradoc_130370.pdf p.14
6 http://www.bruegel.org/uploads/tx_btbbreugel/bp_trade_jan09.pdf
7 Phone booths in Geneva accept Euro coins, but not because they are legally required to do so. We have not discussed
here the EU South Africa TADC. It is worth remarking that S Africa unilaterally decided to adopt EU water quality rules
to gain market access, not because of a TADC obligation6
protection, indirect taxation, technical rules and standards, transport and the
environment.”
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This is literally a “best endeavours” obligation. Approximation, indeed
harmonisation, of laws proceeded at a faster pace than this text would seem to require. This
was due to the process of implementation of this agreement which was accompanied by the
separate pre-accession process wherein the candidates were told exactly what laws to
change in order to become members. In fact this is part of a general phenomenon. The
FTAs themselves only reflect in a small way the other factors that may drive the trend
towards approximation with EU norms, the wish to accede and the need to make products
that are acceptable in EU markets.
We do see an evolution of the texts in subsequent agreements. The 1995 White
Paper on extending the internal market to the CEECs made it clear that the partners had to
accept all relevant EU acquis as a necessary but not sufficient condition to the elimination
of contingent protection.
2.3 EU- Russia, Georgia, Armenia & Ukraine
Meanwhile thinking about EU-Russia, EU-Georgia and EU-Armenia negotiations
on possible free trade agreements has highlighted a number of key issues in terms of
flanking measures where the EU might wish to see deep integration aspects. We can
distinguish between two main groups of problem: 1) gaps or deficiencies in domestic
legislation; 2) problems of implementation of domestic legislation. Some key areas are
competition policy, IPRs and conditions for investment. All three states have competition
statutes on the books. In addition to technical weaknesses in the legislation, there is a
serious issue of the political feasibility of competition agencies actually taking on
entrenched actors. In Russia, the power of the oligarchs hardly needs to be mentioned,
whilst in Armenia, the key issue is that channels of imports are in a few highly restrictive
hands. Thus there are major issues that are directly relevant to trade in the competition
domain and if the EU is serious about addressing all problems that create obstacles to
trade. It would have to include effective competition provisions in these agreements that
are tougher than the ones normally included in its non-candidate FTAs.
However, the likelihood of effective implementation of competition policy is slight.
We see that the EU is torn between a political desire to sign symbolically important FTAs
and the risk of further legal inflation. The situation is similar with respect to IPRs - all
three states have statutes that are close to TRIPS compatible, but enforcement is patchy.
FTAs might not be able to go much beyond consolidating TRIPS (which Russia is not yet a
signatory to). A further issue is of technical standards. Russia has expressed willingness in
the WTO context to harmonise with international standards, but given the weakness of its
standards infrastructure, any mutual recognition of conformity assessment would be
problematic. It is widely argued that Russia deliberately uses standards for political and
protectionist purposes (Dyker 2009, Roth 2009).
The EU is currently in negotiation for a Deep Integration agreement with Ukraine.
The EU wants this to be very comprehensive and reformers in Ukraine do as well, but
harmonisation of rules on competition and investment are likely to be opposed by
8 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21993A1231(18):EN:HTML7
oligarchs! On the other hand, Ukraine is, in one respect like Switzerland: to supply its
major export market it must produce substantially to EU standards and have reliable
quality controls, otherwise expect lengthy post-import inspections.
Whether to include investment provisions in the FTAs is highly problematic. As
with the Euromed and CARIFORUM partners (see below), the key to securing
development gains from deep integration elements in FTAs is that the external negotiations
provide a lever for policy makers to secure necessary internal reform that will, for
example, ensure greater business certainty across the board for domestic as well as foreign
investors. If the willingness to do this is absent, then we are faced with the question of
whether it makes sense to use FTAs as signals of aspirations.
2.4 The extent of deep integration in the agreements with Mediterranean Partners
The EU recently proclaimed its intention to allow Euromed partners to have a
“stake in the internal market”. However, the lack of clarity in the EU aims has led to the
shelving of this notion and a more realistic assessment of the realities and possibilities. We
consider here some areas where the Euromed process has aspirations that go beyond the
basic shallow integration process.
It is well known in the literature that technical standards as such are not barriers to
trade. Standards themselves are just standard definitions of product or process
specifications. They can become barriers to trade if they are linked to restrictive mandatory
regulations. Trade can be obstructed even when standards are harmonised if the process of
verifying compliance with standards problematic (conformity assessment), or if there is an
inadequate infrastructure to assess the processes of conformity assessment in partner
country (accreditation). A commitment by a partner country to adopt EU norms as
standards would have very limited effect. A commitment to adopt and make them
mandatory would facilitate trade so long as the producers in question could easily get
documentation certifying their conformity.
The problem for a partner country is that committing to mandatory adoption of EU
standards can secure very little by way of market access unless the EU is able to trust the
whole standards infrastructure of the partner. If it does not, then the partner has to incur the
costs of conforming to EU norms and of the certification of exports. There is a limited gain
for exporting firms until they get the mutual recognition of their local conformity
assessment. However, for purely domestic businesses, the gains are not so clear since they
might be driven out of business by higher costs.
Mutual recognition of conformity assessment is a step that can only follow a major
internal reform process; it is not something that a trade agreement can create without pre-
conditions. It has been included in EU-Korea; however, as mentioned above, it took 10
years before mutual recognition of conformity assessment was implemented after the EU-
Turkey custom union was signed. In the case of the agreements between EU and US,
mutual recognition agreement on conformity assessment signed in 1998 was a framework
arrangement only and it took many years for the first sectoral agreements to be signed.
The recent generation of Euromed agreements contain provisions on technical
barriers in general and in the food and agricultural areas, as covered by the WTO TBT and
SPS agreements. However, detailed examination of the texts reveals the vagueness. The8
fact remains that countries cannot sell into the EU unless their food standards infrastructure
satisfies the EU Food and Feed Directive – and the private standards regimes associated
with it such as the supermarkets’ Europgap (now Globalgap
9) rules. We should also note
that the 1996 EU-Turkey Customs Union has features of a pre-accession agreement. Its
demands are indeed very strong by way of harmonisation, especially on competition
including state aids. Turkey was called on in effect to harmonise all its technical
regulations with the EU. This did not, however, guarantee market access for Turkish
products because it was not until 2006 that a Mutual Recognition agreement was signed
with respect to conformity assessment, without which Turkish goods were subject to
administrative checks at the border. The Euromed agreements did not have this pre-
accession character.
Muller-Jentsch (2004) argue the actual degree of market opening in services in
Euromed is very small even though the gains from service trade expansion were potentially
much greater for the region than that for goods. To go further would require changing the
whole domestic system in the partners.
3. Other agreements EU- Chile, India, Korea, Colombia-Peru
Looking more briefly at other agreements, we find the EU-Chile FTA (1999)
makes quite limited commitments on TBT and SPS norms. It is clearly not possible to
expect Chile to adopt EU rules and the chosen strategy is one of creating procedures to
establish “equivalence”. The EU-Chile FTA is remarkably in details laying out a pathway
for mutual recognition of standards and conformity assessment with a-partner who could
not be expected to adopt EU norms, but with its own quite sophisticated standards
infrastructure. Despite detailed terms of the agreement the path to actual mutual
recognition has not been taken. These carefully crafted provisions do not appear to have
been used, leaving them still in the category of “legal inflation”.
EU-Chile FTA does include what appear to be sectoral commitments beyond
GATS on services. It is hard to read how much extra they give without very careful
inspection. Chile, for example, leaves mode 4 “Movement of natural persons” unbound,
except for “transfers of natural persons within a foreign enterprise established in Chile, in
accordance to [ Mode] (3)”. The EU-Chile FTA does include some other elements that
Chile has not committed to at the WTO, eg Government Procurement.
According to the Commission “The EU-Mexico FTA is one of the most
comprehensive in the global economy” But the 2000 agreement confirming the 1997 EU
Mexico FTA
10has little to say on technical norms beyond:
“The Parties shall intensify their bilateral cooperation in this field in light of their
mutual interest to facilitate access to both Parties markets and to increase mutual
understanding and awareness of their respective systems. To this end, the Parties
shall work towards: (a) exchanging information on standards, technical regulations
and conformity assessment procedures;”
9 See www.globalgap.org/
10DECISION No 2/2000 OF THE EC-MEXICO JOINT COUNCIL of 23 March 2000 on the Interim Agreement on
trade and trade related matters http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/october/tradoc_111828.pdf9
On the other hand, in public procurement, it does go somewhat beyond the WTO
and it also establishes a cooperation mechanism in competition policy.
The EU-India agreement is currently under negotiation. It is too early to predict the
exact contents of the agreement. Our preliminary analysis suggests that there is at least the
possibility of an agreement with deep integration elements. To be realistic, progress on
technical barriers in goods and SPS is likely to be limited. There are, however, a number of
areas where services liberalisation might be made to add up to a mutually beneficial
bargain, eg in legal services. Most of the areas where something might happen are those
where either India is generally closed or the issue to be addressed calls for simplification
and transparency of Indian procedures. The biggest pay-off to India would come in the
form of domestic reform. A draft version of the chapter on trade in goods published by
bilaterals.org
11 indicates that the SPS section appears to have been modelled on the EU-
Chile agreement. It could create a pathway towards recognition of equivalence in standards
and compliance which may or may not involve further inspection of goods as they arrive in
the EU, however, it does not provide a guaranteed access, and in any case could be
suspended at any time. The Chilean model if applied could eventually lead to major
advances in the recognition of equivalence, but as we have seen, even in the US and the
Chilean cases, the sectoral implementation agreements have not happened as hoped for.
The information we had on services suggested that India was seeking to use this as
a chance to further continue with its unilateral liberalisation, perhaps in areas where there
are net gains to India with clearly identifiable winners and losers. An obvious example
arises in the case of pressures to liberalise Indian retailing. It seems likely that opening to
foreign competition will increase efficiency, but not only will many small shopkeepers
suffer, so too will those consumers unable to access new retail outlets so easily. On the
other hand, liberalising commercial legal services would allow the same firms who were
suffering from additional competition from newly entering EU firms to profit from
outsourcing. The IPR section of the draft text is very long and detailed. The leaked draft
notes that India is ready to negotiate for a high level of protection for geographical
indicators, and the draft text goes into many details of domestic rules, such as the liability
of internet providers under “mere conduit”. At various points in the text it is noted that
India would prefer less binding language but the degree of detail being discussed is
striking. This appears to be an instance where some of it could still be binding.
Overall, in the case of EU-India, if a comprehensive agreement takes place it will
cover those areas where there is an autonomous will on the India side to liberalise. The EU
will not relax its scrutiny on technical standards in the areas which it does not wish. India
will not open markets where there is no domestic policy interest. At the time of writing
negotiations are stuck on trade and labour issues, though as we shall see,.EU agreements so
far do not set a very strong precedent.
There are clearly political pressures in the EU with regards to EU- Korea and EU-
Colombia-Peru FTAs on labour issues . The texts of the agreements reveal again much





Article 1 and Article 267 Right to regulate and levels of protection “Recognising the sovereign right of Parties to set
their domestic policies and priorities of sustainable development, their own levels of environmental and labour10
EU-Korea is a model for an FTA with an industrial country that is not in the EU
sphere of influence. It contains important services commitments and whilst it obviously
does not have as its basis of harmonisation with EU norms, the sensitive area such as cars
and the electronics provisions provide for MR including element of conformity
assessment. The agreement does contain labour and environment provisions but these are
largely aspirational and the one firm commitment appears to be “A Party shall not fail to
effectively enforce its environmental and labour laws, through a sustained or recurring
course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade or investment between the
Parties.” The labour provisions do not appear to be subject to binding dispute settlement.
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4. EU-ACP EPAS: Non trade issues
The EU was forced to replace its unilateral preferences to ACP countries by
reciprocal FTAs to ensure WTO compliance. The EU aspired to secure deals that were
genuinely deep. However, only the CARIFORUM agreement is a full “EPA”. Interim
agreements have been signed with others. But in this section we look at what is in the
CARIFORUM EPA and what rendez-vous clauses are in the interim agreements as
indications of the parties’ intentions.
At first impression to the outside observer the non-trade provisions of the
CARIFORUM agreement could be seen as an attempt by the EU to force “deep”
integration issues on to a reluctant CARIFORUM partner. We do have the evidence
however that the non-trade issues included were those that the CARIFORUM negotiators
saw as meeting the development needs of CARIFORUM countries. This should be
accompanied by the caveat that the CNRM negotiation team who did the negotiations on
behalf of all CARIFORUM countries might have had different preferences from the
individual states.
Most of the provisions in CARIFORUM agreement are fairly weak, and if this is
the ideal model for other EPA agreements, there may be little to hope or fear. Striking
provisions which have some possible development implications are the IP provisions
which do include elements likely to be of interest to the region eg on music; the intra-
CARIFORUM liberalisation of procurement; and the interesting trade and environment
provision which do not lay down any new obligations but rule out reductions in standards
to attract investment. The investment provisions are hard to read.
14 The interim EPAs by
definition do not include non-trade issues but one can see from the differences in the texts
what development aims might have been in the minds of the negotiators for eventual full
EPAs.
protection, consistent with the internationally recognised standards and agreements referred to in Articles 3 and 4, and to
adopt or modify accordingly their relevant laws, regulations and policies; each Party shall strive to ensure that its relevant
laws and policies provide for and encourage high levels of environmental and labour protection”.
13 ARTICLE 13.14: GOVERNMENT CONSULTATIONS;
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/october/tradoc_145185.pdf
14But Ramesh Chaitoo of the CNRM has stated that CF wished to go further than the EU “EPA Negotiations -
Services and investment” (Digital Library:Negotiation Arenas/CARIFORUM-EC EPA/EPA Related
Workshops/Regional EPA Media Workshop/Media Workshop Presentations) Tuesday, 28 July 2009” at
http://www.crnm.org11
The interim agreements are not identical and vary according to the negotiations.
Whether the pattern of differentiation corresponds to any discernible development needs is
another question. CARIFORUM countries saw a clear interest in including all the issues.
Others did not. But it is not clear to the observer what lies behind the choice of priorities in
the declared aspirations. Why should “Central Africa” (ie Cameroun) commit to negotiate
on data protection and make firmer but, one suspects, unsustainable commitments to
negotiate on competition than ESA and SADC? The latter have in fact begun to develop
competition infrastructure at both regional (COMESA) and national (South Africa) level
and might well have been able to profit from firm commitments on cooperation.
The TBT provisions in all the interim agreements are fairly vacuous but tailored to
each case. Only SADC speaks of the possibility of an eventual mutual recognition
agreement. We know, however, that this has proved extremely hard to implement even in
the case of EU-US and EU-Chile. It is difficult to know what the long but variable list of
aspirations for future negotiations signify. Some of the agreements provide for social and
environment negotiations but all without content. Arbitrariness is suggested by the fact that
the Central Africa Agreement contains extremely ambitious promises for further
negotiations (including data protection and TBT), and makes reference to “Central Africa”
as a party whereas the signatory is in fact Cameroun. If it is indeed the case that the
agreement binds only Cameroun, it is very hard to see what could be meant by a loose
commitment to harmonise standards in “Central Africa” or to allow free circulation within
the region.
The TBT provisions in the interim EPAs are fairly vacuous in every case even
where they are more rather than less detailed. EU-Ghana has a single chapter on SPS and
TBT The EU-SADC agreement is the most elaborate with regards to TBT issues. It has a
fairly ambitious aspirations, but no binding obligations. The language refers to the
possibility of a mutual recognition agreement, it is in fact much less explicit on the
potential pathway to achieving it.
With regards to institutions and dispute settlement, all the agreements, even the
CARIFORUM are a little vague about how deeper provisions are to be negotiated or
implemented, though some have more than others. However, several of the agreements
contain very detailed provisions for multi-layered dispute settlement processes. It is far
from obvious without specialised legal analysis what these mean. It is particularly
uncertain what the development implications of having more details in the dispute
settlement process than in the nature of the obligations.
Horn, Mavroidis and Sapir (2009) are especially critical in their analysis of EU
FTAs agreements which purport to give binding effect to commitments that are so vague it
would be very hard to decide whether one party has for example refused to “cooperate”.
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4.1 CARIFORUM
We now explore in more depth the CARIFORUM. It would be tempting to see the
CARIFORUM EPA as a model and consider its implications for negotiators of other texts,
15 Horn, Henrik, Mavroidis, Petros C. and Sapir, Andre,Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and Us ... Bruegel 200912
but this would be misleading. As Sauvé and Wood (and also discussions with
CARIFORUM negotiators make clear) the CARIFORUM outcome is specific to that
region where there were:
 quite specific “offensive” interests that fitted with the EU’s aim of a broad
agreement
 a well established regional negotiating machinery
 existing agenda for regional integration that matched the EPA concept
 some individual member states eager to push the deal
Hence the broad scope was not something that was resisted by the CARIFORUM side.
One CARIFORUM negotiator has said that the topics agreed in the EPA were all ones
where the CARIFORUM side wanted to make progress except for one area where they
were subsequently convinced that it was in fact in their interest.
16
On competition policy, it has a standard feature of EU agreement but little of
substance. The competition provisions go little beyond asserting that anti-competitive
behaviour that distorts trade is incompatible with the agreement and allowing (not
obliging) information exchange. There is an exemption to enshrine the right to keep state
monopolies but these must not act to distort trade. The context contains the marks of
already active development of the CARICOM Competition Commission. Meanwhile the
IP provisions clearly see compromise from both sides and are also a mixture of new
measures that the EU wants everyone to adopt, many of which are of no relevance to the
CARIFORUM states. The public procurement chapter interestingly includes an instrument
for intra CARIFORUM liberalisation as well as market opening to the EU. As Sauvé and
Wood note that the main obligations are for transparency rather than liberalisation as such.
The environmental and social provisions contain few binding constraints, and reaffirm the
right to regulate at developmentally appropriate levels, but do provide an interesting
requirement against the lowering existing standards as an investment incentive.(Art 73)
The provisions on investment are hard to read. Title II is called “INVESTMENT, TRADE
IN SERVICES AND E-COMMERCE”. It appears to cover all investment and yet almost
every detailed provision is about services.
The investment provisions would appear to rule out any investor-state implications, but
it is not clear if investment is excluded from state to state dispute. Naïve reading of these
texts in the absence of any insight into the negotiations process would lead one to suppose
that during the negotiations the EU had demanded CARIFORUM enter into a
comprehensive Trade and Investment Agreement but that CARIFORUM had insisted on
discussing only GATS issues . A completely different interpretation is however suggested
by R. Chaitoo Head, Services Trade Unit of the CNRM
17. Chaitoo makes it clear that the
agreement covers investment and services not investment in services. He clearly states
that it was the CARIFORUM side who wanted a more comprehensive investment
agreement.
The TBT provisions are very loose indeed. The CARIFORUM agreement does not
contain any binding obligations other than to “cooperate”. It states as an aim to use single
16 Junior Lodge at WTO Public Forum 2008
17 See “EPA Negotiations - Services and investment” (Digtial Library:Negotiation Arenas/CARIFORUM-EC EPA/EPA
Related Workshops/Regional EPA Media Workshop/Media Workshop Presentations) Tuesday, 28 July 2009” at
http://www.crnm.org13
point of contact to consult over any issues that arise. The whole TBT section of the
agreement is approximately a page long with no implementation mechanism spelled out.
There is no reference to any procedures or processes to give effect to it.
With regards to environment and labour, as noted above the CARIFORUM
agreement contains an interesting and innovative provision that requires CARIFORUM not
to reduce its standards to attract FDI without adding any other commitments. This is not
the case in any of the other agreements, for examples, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire and SADC are
essentially silent on these issues. Central Africa and ESA EPAs have references that can
hardly be seen as a binding obligation. There is no explicit reference to labour standards.
4.2 Dispute Settlement in CARIFORUM and the Interim EPAS
The exact significance of the dispute settlement provisions requires a lawyer to
examine in detail what they might mean, and in fact a lawyer with a chrystal ball to figure
out how they will be used. The most obvious interpretation would be that they provide a
detailed pathway for arbitration and the achievement of a diplomatic solution. It is
interesting to note that there is a provision for (voluntary) offer of financial compensation
for non compliance with a DS decision. Nevertheless at the end of the diplomatic process
there is a provision that allows certain measures to be taken.
Interviews with CARIFORUM officials suggest their commitment to an agreement
with deep integration elements. However, other source suggest that like the EU,
CARIFORUM itself was trying to use the external negotiations and external pressures to
press its member states to move faster to create their own single market. Other regional
EPAs certainly lack this.
Examining the interim EPAs, it is clearly seen that there are no other provisions
rather than trade in goods, but have some form of rendez-vous clause. This means a
commitment to complete the Interim agreement with subsequent deeper agreements. As
background research for a report on the EPA process the prospective coverage of all the
rendezvous clauses in the interim EPAs was reviewed. The basic conclusion is that they
differ from agreement to agreement suggesting that the EU did not simply impose a
common template, certainly in all interim agreements singed by African countries.
Despite lack of substance, the dispute settlement provisions of the interim EPAs are
quite lengthy and again would need legal reading. Some are brief but where they are
spelled out they follow CARIFORUM. There is a lengthy mediation process spelled out to
be followed by an arbitration process, but it is far from clear that these are in a formal
sense binding. Moreover, as Horn, Mavroidis and Sapir (2009) point out, very vague
commitments cannot be justiciable.
5. Why is it so hard to conclude deep agreements? is it worth the
trouble?
It is evident that the EU has had very limited success in its agenda of pursuing
“deep integration”. EU-Mexico agreement is quite advanced in some areas but other
exceptions are the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, and perhaps EU-Korea and EU-India. Even
in the area where the EU has been most enthusiastic about “trade and..” agenda in its14
FTAs, namely competition policy, the results have been disappointing summed up in the
words of Lucian Cernat: “Eager to ink, But ready to act?”
18
Horn, Mavroidis and Sapir (2009) speculate on why the EU has been so eager to
sign deep agreements with so little content. They offer a number of hypotheses. Pisani
Ferry’s introduction summarises it thus:
“One is simply that the EU proselytises and uses trade policy to that end for lack of
any other suitable instrument. It wants to promote, say, macroeconomic stability
and human rights and does it through trade policy because it lacks the political
power to do it through foreign policy. Legal inflation would in this case be the by-
product of Europe’s political weakness. A second explanation is that Europe is
seeking to persuade its partners to adopt its policy culture. The idea here is not that
the EU uses trade policy purely as an instrument, but rather that it sees durable
benefit in the generalisation of policy regimes inspired by its own and is willing to
invest for the long term.”
Their main text offers two other interpretations of the funding that enforceable
obligations are most common in the (relatively rare) cases where an issue appears either in
a very small number of cases or in nearly all of them. In the former case, it may be
surmised that there is a very special interest in this issue by the partner who really wanted
it to be included and wanted it to be binding. While in the latter case, if the EU always
includes it, it must be something where the EU has a very strong policy interest. For
middling cases they find fewer binding obligations and they speculate that this could be
because
“either (i) the EC sees itself as being on the ‘paying’ end in these areas, and
manages to ensure that it will more easily escape enforceable obligations in these
areas; or (ii) the partners have less of an interest in these areas, and manage to
ensure softer legal language in return for accepting the enforcement possibilities
that the EC insists on in the areas at the upper end of the scale in terms of
coverage.”
For an agreement to contain binding clauses in a variety of areas the key obstacles
to progress must be sidestepped. It seems likely that a positive motive for including an
issue but in a non-binding way is that this represents, not so much a consensus that a non-
binding text is appropriate as a compromise between those who believe it should be
binding and those who believe it should be absent. It would in fact be a mistake to believe
that these differences are always between parties. Trade and competition authorities
frequently have different views as will trade negotiators and technical regulatory officials.
The result may be that if the EU is seeking to “proselytise” the way it can do so is by first
inserting soft obligations and then hoping that those in favour of using the integration
process as a means for internal upgrading can then use the more technocratic association
process to actually achieve the deeper institutional integration.
The very limited progress in Euromed suggests that deep integration via trade
agreements can only really succeed if it is a catalyst to trigger a domestically sought
process or else if it is backed by the lure of becoming a member of the EU.
18 Cernat in Brusick et al eds. See also Holmes et al in the same volume.15
In the CARIFORUM case, the negotiators essentially agreed to things that they
were originally or eventually persuaded were in fact in their own interest. It is clear from
the preceding analysis as well as from the papers by Sapir et al and Bourgeois et al that if
the EU is to really address the issue of deep integration, it will have to adopt an approach
that is quite distinct from the one it has adopted so far in extending the commitments
beyond GATT/WTO in extremely soft ways. It looms as if the FTAs signed by the EU had
only a very marginal impact on deep integration issues. The driving force pressing
countries to adopt EU rules appears to be the necessity to sell to the EU, or to be able to
accede.
Garcia Bercero (2005), a senior Commission official offers a slightly different take
on it. He argues that while pre-2000 EU RTAs were soft in most respects, EU-Chile and
EU-Mexico are unusual in incorporating some elements of binding dispute settlement.
However the most sensitive issues are typically excluded, eg anti-dumping and CVDs in
EU-Mexico, Government Procurement and competition in EU-Chile. The inclusion of
some non-WTO binding dispute settlement can still be seen as a first step extending the
EU’s rule-based approach to the rest of the world.
The one rationale we can read into this is that soft law is seen as a precursor to firm
hard law provisions. The competition provisions can be read in this light: they provide a
framework under which the authorities can cooperate without obliging them to do so.
Similarly most TBT and SPS provisions apart from EU-Korea provide for negotiating
routes. One may also speculate that these RTAs are a possible template for WTO rules.
However, most analysis are sceptical whether this evolutionary path will really work even
within the FTAs, and it seems very likely that both parties would have to be really
committed.
The mystery then is still not so much why EU partners sign up to draconian
provisions but why the EU invests so much effort in securing non-justiciable provisions.
Probably the best hypothesis is the one suggested above: elaborate but meaningless
provisions are a face-saving compromise between no reference and a binding commitment,
but this does not exclude that the EU side genuinely hopes soft law will set precedents that
can harden.16
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